Government OSS policy

From OpenEGov

The UK government's policy on government use of free software - presented in Open Source Software Use within UK Government - is one of the few to be recommended by the Initiative for Software Choice as a model to be followed by other countries (the others are Denmark and New Zealand). The Initiative for Software Choice is run by the Computer Technology Industry Association, leading members of which include not only HP and IBM, but also Microsoft. The Initiative for Software Choice bases its arguments on four principles:

1. Procure software on its merits, not through categorical preferences
2. Promote broad availability of government funded research
3. Promote interoperability through platform-neutral standards
4. Maintain a choice of strong intellectual property protections

These appear to be the principles which the UK government is implementing step by step in its policy guidelines; the first and core principle being the focus of the first version of Open Source Software Use within UK Government; the second being the focus of the current iteration of the document; and the fourth being central to the 'next steps' described in the current (draft) version.

The use of platform-neutral standards is the least problematic of these principles, perhaps because nothing else would allow a coalition of proprietary software companies to work together; the issues here are not at the level of principle, but of interpretation and realisation, and the explicit clauses concerning this in the UK government policy are similarly uncontroversial. The actual operation of e-GIF is not dealt with in these documents.

The other three principles each disguise a strong bias towards non-free software.

'Procure software on its merits, not through categorical preferences' is in practice often reduced to 'procure software in terms of value for money'; but even where it is not, it rules out perfectly valid reasons for selecting software. For some purposes access to the source code of programs is essential. Software used for electronic vote counting, for example, should be available for public scrutiny, as should software used to calculate individual taxes. Yet such 'categorical preferences' for open source software appear to be ruled out in advance by this principle. The only way round this would seem to be, where appropriate, to argue that open source code is an element of value.

The UK version of this principle, unchanged from first to current draft, is:

UK Government will consider OSS solutions alongside proprietary ones in 
IT procurements. Contracts will be awarded on a value for money basis.

However, a new clause has been added to the Justification section of the policy document to further clarify that this principle is to interpreted in the light of Microsoft's current campaign over TCO:

[Adopting this policy .. achieves reduction in cost and risk by] ...acquiring 
solutions that deliver value for money over their whole life

This further reinforces the interpretation that 'value' is to be interpreted in financial terms only.

The major change from version 1 to the current draft is the change in the clause relating to research. Version 1 stated:

UK government will explore further the possibility of using OSS as the 
default exploitation route for Government funded R&D software.

The current version is:

If no commercial exploitation route for publicly funded R&D software is used, 
or it is not made open and exploited within an academic community, it shall 
be released as OSS. 

The intention is clearly to convey that OSS has not been chosen as the default exploitation route for government funded R&D. This use of a categorical preference for one type of software clearly contradicts the overall policy; it is hard to see why categorical preferences should be ruled out in favour of a case by case approach for government software purchases, but not for government software development.

But the new clause introduces additional confusion: the assumption is made that commercial exploitation and OSS are incompatible, which may come as something as a surprise to the university spinoffs which have built companies based on supplying support and documentation for OSS they have created. OSS is not an alternative to commercial exploitation. OSS may be commercially exploited, or it may not. So this clause now makes the default route not just one of commercial exploitation, but of commercial exploitation as non-free, closed source software. Much publicly funded R&D software is created in universities and this closure of alternatives is one that may fit badly with the universities' mission.

The clause continues:

Government guidance on the distinct types of OSI licenses 
will be issued to inform licence choices.

It can be assumed that the 'licence choices' will follow the Software Choice preferred route to 'broad availability': banning Microsoft's bete noire, the GPL. This is the hidden meaning of the Institute for Software Choice's second principle, which they are embarassed to put quite so baldly: 'broadly available' software is software that is available to proprietary software companies, not to the general public. If it can be incorporated in proprietary software, it is lost to the general public - unless they are prepared to pay a second fee for it, having paid once already through their taxes - though perfectly available to the company that has incorporated it. A similar misleading use of words appears in the ISC's fourth principle, where 'strong intellectual property protections' are assumed to rule out some or all OSS licenses - in spite of the fact that these all depend on the existence of enforeable copyright law.

That concludes the main changes in the body of the document. It is the 'Next Steps' that have changed most.

The 'Next Steps' in version 1 were generally concerned with procurement policies. These steps have now been dropped. However, there is no sign given of where these detailed procurement policies, if created, have been published. The OGC OSS pages contain nothing that postdates the 1st version of the document. Were the procurement policies never developed? Unlikely, since that would make the whole document meaningless. Are they secret? Yes, by default. Should they be? Certainly not, if the aim is to create a level playing field for proprietary and OSS software companies.

The 'Next Steps' in the new version are largely concerned with further specifying the actions to take regarding R&D software.

1. As mentioned above, guidance on licences to be used by R&D teams is to be developed. The important point here is that no OSI approved licences should be ruled out.
2. The new R&D policy is to be applied in collaboration agreements, research grants, and contracts. The R&D clause discussed above is therefore on the point of being put into practice, and it is urgent that it is contested.
3. Given the disadvantages of a default closed source route for R&D software, the government now has to try to patch its way round the problem, at further expense: the DTI, Research Councils, and JISC are to find ways to provide research access to R&D software, presumably on Microsoft's 'shared source' model.
4. CESG is to examine the issues involved in 'information assurance' of OSS. There is currently no mention of free software on the CESG website, so their expertise and biases in this area might be questioned.
5. The results of the OSS proof of concept trials (APLAWS etc) are to be circulated to the 'government IT community'. Why not to the public? This can hardly be classified information.
6. Further opportunities to exploit OSS are to be explored by eGU (the e-Government Unit) and OGC (the Office of Government Commerce).